Four small argument against naturalistic fallacy

A post that considers the well known "fallacy" of moving from descriptions to normative judgments, particularly prescriptive statements - and offers three small arguments against it.

I think that anyone studying philosophy today encounters fairly early what was once called the "naturalistic fallacy," following the 20th-century British philosopher G.E. Moore. Moore himself thoroughly established this fallacy by referencing Hume's arguments. In this presentation, I will skip the historical nuances and present the distinction as simply as possible.

The essence of the Moore-Hume claim is that one cannot infer moral conclusions from factual descriptions. According to them, the history of philosophy is full of examples of philosophers who "simply did not notice" that in many of their arguments, they implicitly shifted from factual descriptions to prescriptive statements. For instance, from the statement, "Humans develop bodies that survive longer if they have a supply of food and drink available," one cannot conclude that "Humans ought to have a supply of food and drink." The inference from the first statement to the second is considered invalid. The second statement does not logically follow from the first.

Briefly, I will present three well-known objections to this being a genuine fallacy, along with one argument of my own.

1. Anscombe's Argument

The philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe argued against the claim that one cannot move from descriptive to prescriptive statements. Her argument has two main points:

1. Implied Prescriptions in Correct Descriptions:
   Some transitions from "is" to "ought" are embedded in descriptions that are undeniably correct. Denying such transitions would render one incapable of understanding the world properly.

2. The Nature of Human Needs and Desires:
   A subtler argument regarding the relationship between factual descriptions of human needs and the values tied to them.

Example:

Imagine telling your grocer: "The world is divided into factual and value judgments. That you delivered potatoes here, displayed them, and I bought them from you for ten shekels are matters of fact. But from this, one cannot infer that I owe you ten shekels—that's a value judgment."

Anscombe breaks down this example using an Aristotelian distinction between primary and secondary descriptions. "Eli owes the grocer ten shekels" is a primary description relative to a secondary one like "Eli can pay his debt to the grocer." The secondary description depends on the truth of the primary one, barring special unforeseen circumstances. Similarly, "Eli owes the grocer ten shekels" can itself be secondary to more primary descriptions like "The grocer delivered the potatoes, displayed them, and Eli bought them." Denying such transitions would require rejecting not only outdated philosophical arguments but also an entire framework of human interaction.

2. Human Needs and Desires

According to Anscombe, factual descriptions can influence value judgments. Consider a flower: Factually, "A flower needs water and sunlight to bloom." This does not imply, "The flower ought to bloom." Whether it should bloom depends on whether we want it to.

Similarly, consider, "Humans need food and water to survive." According to Hume's argument, it does not follow that "Humans ought to have food and water." However, from the fact that "Humans need food and water to survive," one can infer that "It is impossible for us not to desire food and water." In this sense, factual descriptions about humans imply something about our desires.

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3. Searle's Argument

John Searle offered a counterexample where he argued that "ought" can be derived from "is" through a logically valid argument. He went further, suggesting an alternative theory based on speech-act theory (Austin) rather than the traditional fact-value distinction.

Example:

1. Jones said the words, "I promise you, Smith, to pay you five shekels."

2. Jones promised to pay Smith five shekels.

3. Jones committed himself to paying Smith five shekels.

4. Jones owes Smith five shekels.

5. Jones ought to pay Smith five shekels.

In his famous essay How to Derive Ought from Is, Searle defended this example from various objections, showing how promises inherently combine factual and normative implications through speech acts.

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4. MacIntyre’s Argument

Alasdair MacIntyre argued that it is impossible to describe factual reality without including descriptions of purposes or goals. Whether this claim is correct is a separate issue (scientific, metaphysical, etc.), but if there are natural or divine purposes that characterize humans, then there is no logical fallacy in moving from a factual description of a purpose to a moral prescription.

For example:

1. "God created humans to reproduce" (a factual claim).

2. "A human who does not reproduce is not a good human" (a moral claim).

MacIntyre's argument rests on the long-standing philosophical intuition that if something has a purpose (like a knife's purpose is to cut), and it fails to fulfill that purpose (the knife doesn't cut), then it can be judged as "not good."

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My Own Argument

In general, it seems incorrect to treat normative and factual statements as entirely independent. This becomes especially clear when describing historical periods or systems like "capitalism." For example, if establishing a Marxist communist state is factually impossible, one could conclude that "It is not desirable to try to establish it." Conversely, if it were possible, one might argue that "It would be desirable to establish it."

Similarly, competing historical interpretations that explain facts equally well might still warrant choosing the one that better serves the present. This normative judgment affects the factual description itself. While calling this process "fact" or "value" may seem awkward, the intuition behind it appears valid.